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Abstract: Dieser Beitrag bietet eine umfassende Diskussion des Textes “Hu-
manismus und Christentum” (1950) des dänischen Philosophen und Theologen
Knud E. Løgstrup. Er verortet den Text in seinem geistesgeschichtlichen Kon-
text und analysiert seine wichtigsten Argumente wie auch seine zentrale These,
der zufolge Humanismus und Christentum einen entscheidenden Grundsatz
teilen, insofern beide die Ethik als “stumm“ oder “unausgesprochen“ verstehen.
Darüber hinaus wird dargelegt, wie Løgstrups Text zentrale Überlegungen in
dessen späteren Publikationen, besonders in dem Hauptwerk Die ethische For-
derung (1956), vorwegnimmt.
Keywords: Knud E. Løgstrup, Humanism, Christian Ethics, Rudolf Bultmann,
Søren A. Kierkegaard
Knud E. Løgstrup’s article “Humanism and Christianity” (1950)1 is a discussion
of the relation between the two schools of thought mentioned in the title, but
in a way that is set against key ideas in ethics which Løgstrup was developing
at this time, and which came to full expression in his main work The Ethical
Demand that was published six years later. While this can perhaps make the
article hard to follow for those who are unfamiliar with Løgstrup’s thought, it
also gives it a kind of depth and originality that is not often found in debates
between humanists on the one hand and Christians on the other, and also
provides Løgstrup with a striking opportunity to find a novel kind of common
ground between the two.
1 References given in the text are to K. E. Løgstrup’s paper “Humanisme og kristendom.” Heretica
3 (1950): 456–474 (before the slash) and to the translation on pp. 132–146 in this journal (after
the slash). Our article is a companion piece to this translation.
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We will begin by outlining the main ideas put forward in the article, and
then set Løgstrup’s ideas in context against the background of debates in his
time concerning the relation between humanism and Christianity and what this
tells us about the development of Løgstrup’s own thinking on these fundamental
issues.
1 The Article
The article begins in an arresting and rather puzzling way: “Humanism is –
among many other things – having the sense of a certain conflict, the implica-
tion being that where the sense of the conflict is lost, inhumanity arises. What
conflict?” (456/133). This can be somewhat puzzling to the reader, because Løg-
strup does not immediately answer his question and tell us what the conflict is;
rather, he instead sets o to specify the context that is necessary for his eventual
answer, which comes two pages later – and where that context is provided by
his distinctive conception of the ethical relation between individuals, which is
that we are dependent on one another, and so hold each other’s lives in our
hands. The conflict, it thus turns out, is whether in relating to other people
in this way, we should do what is best for them, or simply do whatever it is
that they ask of us. To do the latter, Løgstrup argues, would be to ignore the
ethical demand that arises when others need our help, for this is “silent” or
“unspoken” in the sense that it is not simply to be equated with what others say
they need, as this can go against their actual needs and interests. On the other
hand, to seek to do what we think is best for them instead has obvious dangers
of intrusion and encroachment, where we risk imposing our own understanding
of life over theirs, and using that understanding as an “ideology” or fixed set
of values to ride roughshod over them. And we cannot get out of this conflict
by fooling ourselves into thinking that really others don’t need us at all, or that
they have a right to autonomy which means we should just do what they ask,
whatever that may be; rather, we have to find a way to strike a balance between
these competing pressures. It is this conflict, Løgstrup suggests, that humanism
recognizes, and so stands at a crossroads between “philistinism” and “ideology”,
“retaining a lively awareness that we always stand in the conflict between a con-
sideration which amounts to indulgence, acquiescence and flattery on the one
hand, and an inconsiderateness that for our own understanding of life’s sake
becomes intrusion and encroachment on the other” (463/138).
Having introduced humanism in this way, Løgstrup then turns to Christian-
ity. He argues that unlike humanism, once it takes on an institutional form,
Christianity is at grave risk of becoming insensitive to this conflict, as its under-
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standing of life all too easily becomes ossified and absolute, and if that happens,
it will then see no diculty in imposing this understanding of life on people for
their own good. Moreover, Løgstrup suggests, there is an extra temptation for
contemporary Christianity to take this route, as the pressures of secularization
push it to find a role for religion, which it then locates in trying to regulate civil
and political life in terms of its religious understanding of how we should live.
However, despite this divergence between humanism and institutional Chris-
tianity, Løgstrup maintains that Christianity at a more fundamental level, as
expressed in Jesus’s proclamation to love the neighbour, is not that distant
from humanism, insofar as both treat this ethical relation of neighbour love as
essential to what makes us human. Moreover, both (when rightly understood)
see in that ethical relation something “ungraspable” and “mysterious”, and so
recognize that “our life’s mystery is not the gender dierence and fertility that
connects us with nature and is nature in us, but it is the unspoken demand, that
lies in the life that we have together” (466 f./140). Løgstrup characterizes the
demand as ungraspable and mysterious in this way because we cannot simply
grasp it, both in the sense of escaping it or controlling it, as we cannot escape
our responsibility for the other and are given no chances for claiming our own
right through reciprocity; while it is mysterious in the sense that it is hidden
below the immediate surface of our lives, as it is not based on any reciprocal
agreement, or connected to any social or personal ties, and may even ask us
to love the enemy. A Christianity that sees itself as just organizing social life
around certain religious doctrines, and a Hobbesian humanism that sees itself
as just organizing social life to safeguard our individual interests, may both lose
a sense of the centrality of this ethical demand – but Løgstrup takes these to be
degenerate versions of both positions, and in their right form, Christianity and
humanism should be able to converge on this centrality.
Nonetheless, of course, Løgstrup notes that even with regard to just the
ethical demand, Christianity will dier from humanism in taking that demand
to come from God, which will therefore give Christianity a dierent take on
what it is that makes the demand “silent” and non-reciprocal: namely, that we
cannot simply do what the other asks, because it is God who asks us to act
instead, while God himself gives to us without expecting anything in return. The
Christian therefore bases their ethical conception on a religious framework. Nev-
ertheless, Løgstrup argues, the fundamental ethical outlook of both Christianity
and humanism should be seen as being the same, namely that of being required
to do what is best for the other person whose life is in your hands, in a way that
is then “silent” and non-reciprocal, even if the one position oers a religious
explanation for these features in a way that the other does not.
Løgstrup then considers a possible challenge to this claim of convergence:
Authenticated | r.stern@sheffield.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 11/9/19 1:09 PM
100 Bjørn Rabjerg, Robert Stern
namely, it could be argued that he is mistaken to claim that for the Christian,
ethics is “silent”, as the words of Jesus can be used to give it a kind of content
and determinacy that Løgstrup has suggested it lacks, and which can then form
the basis for a socially enforced religious ethics concerning sexual and cultural
matters, for example. Løgstrup, however, rejects any such claim regarding a
specifically Christian ethics. His response to this challenge is therefore to argue
that in fact, if one looks at the biblical evidence, Jesus rarely specifies in any
detail how we should behave towards one another, so that “[a]ll his words
speak of the one demand, but with not one word does he break its silence”
(473/145). Instead, Løgstrup argues, it is the kind of institutionalized Christianity
he mentioned earlier which has tried to “fill” this silence with all sorts of rules
and regulations – but these come from the Church and its structures, and not
from Jesus himself.
Thus, Løgstrup concludes, like humanism, as he has characterized it, Chris-
tianity, when properly conceived, should fully appreciate the conflict with which
he began, which arises out of the silence of the ethical demand. Anything that
tries to minimize this conflict by turning ethics into an ideology is just as much
a betrayal of Christianity as it would be a betrayal of humanism, so that in this
way, when properly conceived, these two positions can be said to find common
ground in an ethical outlook such as Løgstrup’s own.
2 The background
Krogerup Folk High School, Humlebæk 20-03-50
Dear Koste2
Please, do not become too excited by receiving a letter fromme. Let me start out by addressing
a dierent matter than what is my real reason for writing to you. [. . .]. But now, let us turn
to the main issue. On June 2–4, here on Krogerup, we will invite some people to attend
a weekend with the purpose of discussing what we nowadays mean with all the chatter
about “humanism”. We are inviting 50–60 people. No short newspaper paraphrases. It is not
supposed to amount to anything useful; we are not trying to find out who is stronger; we just
want to talk completely free from obligations. [. . .]. You will be talking about Christianity’s
position on the problem. [. . .]. You cannot say No. [. . .]. Of course, I have my fears that you
may become too quibbling, [. . .]. So, you will come. You will not be paid, but we will cover
travel expenses and lodging. You can make it by taking the fast train from Aarhus Friday
morning and taking it back home Sunday evening. Please send your Yes immediately.
2 “Koste” was Hal Koch’s nickname for Løgstrup, referring to his thick and dense hair; “kost” in
Danish means “broom”.
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Your
Hal Koch.
Greet everyone from me!3
This is how Løgstrup’s “invitation” to give the paper on humanism and Chris-
tianity read when he received it in late March 1950. It was written by his friend
Hal Koch (1904–63), who was now the principal of Krogerup Folk High School,4
and with whom he had been close friends since they both attended the Danish
“Gymnasium” (equivalent to American “high school” or English “sixth form”)
in 1921, which was Løgstrup’s first and Koch’s third year. It is plain to see that
Koch would not take “no” for an answer, but rather he is commissioning Løg-
strup to deliver his thoughts on humanism and Christianity, without being paid.
In eect, Løgstrup is given a compulsory question to discuss – and only two
months to write his contribution. Løgstrup thus came to present the text as a
paper intended for a group of people specifically invited to discuss humanism
– but in fact, in spite of the audience being ideally suited for a discussion of
Løgstrup’s paper on this topic, no one actually said anything in response! It was
only after Hal Koch had given a lengthy paraphrase of Løgstrup’s main points –
and after Løgstrup’s own confirmation that this was indeed what he had said –
that the discussion then got going.
When reading Løgstrup’s article, we quickly get a sense that he seems to
be struggling a bit with the term “humanism”. He certainly has an agenda and
things he wants to say, but at the same time he tries to combine this agenda
with humanism and the topic he was set by Koch, namely “humanism and
Christianity”. He returns at least three times to the discussion of how to define
the key term, and at several points in the text he examines ways in which these
two schools of thought could be said to relate to each other. However, it is
striking that Løgstrup chooses a very idiosyncratic way to define “humanism”,
doing so without referring to common or standard definitions, which would
usually focus on 1) the value of human agency, 2) the importance of human
freedom in realizing our potential, and 3) the significance of human products
and activities, i. e. culture, to name just a few.
“Humanism” was much debated in the years following World War II, hence
the “chatter” to which Koch refers in his letter to Løgstrup. Sartre published
“Existentialism is a Humanism” in 1946, to which Heidegger wrote his “Letter
On Humanism” as a critical response, published the following year in 1947. For
3 Knud E. Løgstrup, Hal Koch, Venskab og strid. Aarhus: Klim, 2010, 219–220, our translation.
4 Danish FolkHighSchools (Folkehøjskoler) have existed since thedaysofN. F. S.Grundtvig (1783–
1872) and are institutions for adult education intended for Bildung rather than academic degrees.
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Heidegger and Sartre, the context for the discussion was secular and universalist,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 can be seen as a clear
manifestation of the post-WWII orientation towards humanism as a universal
foundation for politics and ethics.
This meant that humanism also became a crucial topic to be re-evaluated
in a theological context, because in the 20th Century, following World War I,
“humanism” had become an increasingly problematic term in modern German
and Danish Theology. In fact, humanism was the main antagonist for many
modern theologians, most prominently Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) who can
be seen as the founding father of theological existentialism – a breakaway branch
of Karl Barth’s (1886–1968) dialectical theology.5
Interestingly, Bultmann also wrote an article called “Humanism and Chris-
tianity”; in fact, he wrote more than one.6 The first was written in 1947 and
published in January 1948.7 Almost two years later, in November 1949, it was
translated into Danish and published in the Danish theological existentialist
journal Tidehverv.8 Although there can be no doubt that he had read Bultmann’s
article, Løgstrup never mentions it; as Hans Hauge puts it in his doctoral dis-
sertation from 1992, K. E. Løgstrup: En moderne profet [K. E. Løgstrup: A Modern
Prophet], Løgstrup’s article belongs to the genre of “texts without references”,9
even though references would have been useful in many places (such as for the
5 To use Stefan Zweig’s famous title, the dialectical and existentially oriented theologians saw
the world of yesterday, the old world from before the Great War, as the epoch of humanism where
human beings indulged in idealistic optimism concerning mankind. However, the new world, the
world emerging from the horrors of World War I, was the epoch of realism about the failure of
human beings and of culture.
6 Cf. also Rudolf Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum.” Historische Zeitschrift 176 (1953):
1–15; translated as “Humanism and Christianity.” Journal of Religion 32 (1952): 77–86.
7 Rudolf Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, originally published in Studium Generale, 1
(1948): 70–77, reprinted in Idem,Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Band 2. Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1965, 133–148 [subsequent references are to the reprinted version];
translated into Danish as “Humanisme og kristendom.” Tidehverv 23 (1949): 77–88, translated
into English by James C. G. Greig as “Humanism and Christianity.” In Rudolf Bultmann, Essays
Philosophical and Theological. London: SCM Press, 1955, 151–167.
8 Tidehverv is a journal founded in 1926. The title means “Turn of the Times”, which clearly indic-
ates the theological orientation of the editors (by alluding to the title of the German dialectical
theological journal Zwischen den Zeiten [Between the Times]), who saw themselves as Barthian
dialectical theologians. Later on, Rudolf Bultmann became a central figure, but the biggest influ-
ence on Tidehverv’s theology was Kristoer Olesen Larsen’s (1899–1964) reading of Kierkegaard.
Olesen Larsen features as Løgstrup’s main opponent in the polemical epilogue in his main work
The Ethical Demand and throughout Løgstrup’s confrontation with Kierkegaardianism.
9 Hans Hauge, K. E. Løgstrup: En moderne profet. Copenhagen: Spektrum, 1992, 219, our transla-
tion.
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statement concerning idealistic ethics of the nineteenth century and how “it
is severely criticized today by both philosophers and theologians” (461/136) –
“who?” one might ask, and “where?”). Still, Bultmann’s earlier article provides
an illuminating context for us when we try to understand what is really going
on in Løgstrup’s article bearing the same name.
Given the antagonism between humanism and Christianity, one might very
easily think that Løgstrup’s attempt to focus on the similarities and common
ground between the two was highly controversial, and that it is thus an early
indication of the future debate between Løgstrup and the Kierkegaardians of
Tidehverv – a debate that culminated with Controverting Kierkegaard in 1968.
And scholars have indeed drawn this conclusion.10 One clear example is found
in Hauge, who states that “Humanism and Christianity” symbolizes “the be-
ginning of Løgstrup’s liberation from Theological Existentialism”, and he finds
further evidence for this in the fact that Løgstrup’s article was published in the
journal Heretica, which was highly critical of Tidehverv.11 Another example is
found in Jes Fabricius Møller’s biography of Løgstrup’s friend Hal Koch, where
Fabricius Møller writes that “if Løgstrup had still been a member of Tidehverv
[tidehvervsmand]” at the time of writing “Humanism and Christianity”, then he
would have claimed “that Humanism and Christianity are like East and West
and that the two could never meet.” He continues by stating that now, however,
“Løgstrup was turning into a Løgstrupian, and this involved first and foremost
a confrontation [opgør] with Kierkegaard and a new attempt at combining the
religious command with what is human.”12
However, a closer inspection of Bultmann’s article on humanism and Chris-
tianity gives us good reason to reconsider these conclusions. In his paper, Bult-
mann sets out, just as one might expect, by defining humanism as having “faith
in the nobility of the human being” through having “faith in the spirit”, while
at the same time claiming that “human beings belong to the spiritual world”,
and by implication that this means that human beings, as spiritual creatures,
belong to “the realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful”, which is also to
say that the true, the good, and the beautiful belong to us as human, spiritual
beings.13 Humanism thus conceived involves the task of learning to “restrain
10 We would like to thank Kees van Kooten Niekerk for his valuable contributions, given in his
unpublished manuscript on “Humanism and Christianity”, which he presented at a research
seminar in systematic theology at Aarhus University in March 2010. Many of the key points in the
following are based on his findings.
11 Hauge, K. E. Løgstrup, 214, our translation.
12 Jes Fabricius Møller, Hal Koch: En biografi. Copenhagen: Gad, 2009, 250, our translation.
13 Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 133–134 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 82 /
“Humanism and Christianity”, 151–153.
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and ennoble” our drives and urges and to thus become a person through the art
of perfecting ourselves.14 This means that according to humanism, we human
beings are the highest end; we carry the highest end and highest significance
as part of our own nature, and therefore we are faced with the ultimate task of
realizing ourselves and our potential. In humanism, the idea of the true guides us
in our quest to master the world; the idea of the good chastens our will and raises
us up towards harmony; and the idea of the beautiful drives art to give rise to
ideals that can serve as invisible goals and ends for our spirits. And it comes as
no surprise that Bultmann, after this definition of humanism, defines Christian-
ity as its virtual opposite, because God is transcendent, not immanent, which
means that the true, the good, and the beautiful are not to be found within our
finite world, but rather outside it. Therefore, according to Christianity, human
beings can have no knowledge of the true, there can only be faith, which is an
entirely dierent category according to Bultmann; the good can only be seen as
God’s command, commanding us to love and at the same time revealing our
guilt for not loving as we should; and the beautiful found in this world can only
be seen as temptation, leading us away from the real beauty beyond the finite
world. Consequently, the “spirit” central to humanism is a spirit that belongs to
this world, it is a manifestation within the finite world of finite ends; whereas
the spirit at the core of Christianity is God, and God is not found in the world
of finite ends, but rather he is an absolute and eternal end beyond this finite
world.
So far, then, Hauge and Fabricius Møller seem fully justified in their conclu-
sion that Løgstrup’s attempt to find common ground between humanism and
Christianity was in fact a break with theological existentialism. However, after
having defined humanism and Christianity as opposites, Bultmann poses the
question whether the relationship between the two is to be conceived of as an
either/or: “humanism or Christianity”?15 And to this, his answer is “no”. First of
all, there are common points of view between the two, for instance, both hu-
manism and Christianity (understood correctly!) reject the idea of a specifically
Christian ethics in favour of a universal ethics. As Bultmann puts it, “admittedly
there are such things as a Christian shoemaker, but there is no Christian way
to make shoes”.16 However, Bultmann goes much further than this. Apart from
14 Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 133–134 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 82 /
“Humanism and Christianity”, 151–153.
15 Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 142 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 86 / “Hu-
manism and Christianity”, 161.
16 Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 138 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 84 / “Hu-
manism and Christianity”, 156.
Authenticated | r.stern@sheffield.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 11/9/19 1:09 PM
On Knud E. Løgstrup’s “Humanism and Christianity” 105
sharing some common ground, humanism and Christianity are involved in a
rich and productive tension, where each individual person repeatedly has to
resolve this tension for themselves, just as each cultural epoch has to resolve the
relationship between these powers in its own way. While one epoch may have
to focus on the dierences between the two, another epoch may have to focus
on what is common, and although Bultmann does not spell it out, it seems clear
that he is in fact thinking of the turn of the times in his own lifetime. Where the
epoch between the two great wars focused on the opposition between humanism
and Christianity, the epoch following World War II calls for a dierent agenda,
namely for humanism and Christianity to jointly fight a common enemy: nihilism
and subjectivism!17
Therefore, even though Bultmann acknowledges that humanism and Chris-
tianity are opposites, they do in fact share common ground, and they can meet
(just as East and West can when they have come full circle, one could say in
response to Fabricius Møller), among other things because they are both enemies
of subjectivism and relativism. As such, they share the outlook that there are
objective standards and truths, although in the end humanism has a mistaken
conception of these truths and standards – and how to reach them.
Moreover, aside from Bultmann’s article, Tidehverv also featured another
article on the topic of humanism and Christianity: “The Gods of the Times
and Christianity” [Tidens Guder og Kristendommen] by Løgstrup’s friend Tage
Wilhjelm, published in March 1949. Here, too, we find the approach that even
though humanism (which Wilhjelm equates with idealism, among other things
because it is founded on an idealization of the human) and Christianity are
opposites, they nonetheless do share important features. Wilhjelm focusses on
the emphasis on and importance of ethics in both, namely the acknowledgment
that there is an ethical demand on us and that the neighbour therefore lays
a claim on us.18 Additionally, just as Bultmann did, he highlights that both
humanism and Christianity (as he conceives it) reject the idea of a specifically
Christian ethics, seeing instead the ethical as a universal category.
Given that both Bultmann and Wilhjelm were key figures in and for Tide-
hverv, it therefore seems safe to assume that the idea of Christianity and hu-
manism being opposites, but still closely connected, was in fact not a very con-
troversial thing for Løgstrup to say in 1950 when he gave his paper. And seeing
also that a crucial connection between the two is to be found within the field of
ethics, while at the same time rejecting the idea of a Christian ethics, Løgstrup’s
17 Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 146 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 87 / “Hu-
manism and Christianity”, 165.
18 Tage Wilhjelm, “Tidens Guder og Kristendommen.” Tidehverv 23 (1949): 25–31, here 29.
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position in “Humanism and Christianity” is in fact very close to the theological
existentialism of his time.
This important insight can now lead us to a better understanding of Løg-
strup’s position in his article. Rather than seeing it as a break with theological
existentialism and Christianity, suggesting that Løgstrup is starting to side with
the humanists against the Christians, the fact of the matter is really close to the
opposite. The reason why Løgstrup is having such a hard time defining “human-
ism”, and why he returns to it several times through the article, is that he does
not side with humanism in opposition to Christianity, but that he is trying to
speak of each side as allies in his search for a universal ethics. And he does this
without thereby engaging in a controversial confrontation with Tidehverv and
theological existentialism, because they, too, subscribed to the same general
idea, namely that ethics must be conceived of as universal, and that Christianity
and humanism share a common conception on this point.
In trying to make humanism an ally, Løgstrup draws attention to the uni-
versal ethical fact that we are each other’s world, because we hold something
of the other person’s life in our hands. Thus, Løgstrup’s humanistic ally is a
dierent version of humanism than the humanism of the previous epoch, the
humanism Bultmann and theological existentialism had fought against, for that
humanism was an idealism intent on perceiving every person as an island, an
autonomous individual working on their own perfection. This is why “[i]n the
nineteenth Century, my topic would probably not have been called humanism
and Christianity, but idealism and Christianity”, as Løgstrup writes in the article
(461/136). However, the humanism Løgstrup is addressing here is based on a
dierent anthropology, namely one that has recognized that the human being is
not sovereign and in control of their own life, because we are too fundamentally
dependent on other people. The Christians know this from Jesus’s proclamation,
but through humanism’s pursuit of the true, the humanists have now come to
know this from “psychology’s and psychiatry’s demonstration of how a child’s
life is determined for their whole future by the adult’s behaviour towards it [. . .]”
(456/133).
Six years later, this and many other statements from “Humanism and Chris-
tianity” were repeated (often word for word) in The Ethical Demand, and by that
time, there was indeed a conflict between Løgstrup and the Kierkegaardians
that was plain for all to see. However, as we have been able to gather from
our discussion of “Humanism and Christianity”, the conflict was not caused by
Løgstrup’s attempt to use humanism as an ally in finding a common ground
within a universal ethics. It was rather caused by other things, such as (to name
just a few) Løgstrup’s position on understanding (truth), namely that truth is not
wholly transcendent, but that genuine truth is found in what the Kierkegaardi-
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ans referred to as the finite world; and that the good (ethics) is not mainly about
our own responsibility, but rather is centred around the other person and how
to help them to the best of our abilities in their worldly lives. The main source of
the controversy was in fact another text from the same year, namely Løgstrup’s
publication of his German lectures on Kierkegaard and Heidegger, where he
criticized the Kierkegaardian conception of the ethical demand.19 Here, we find
a highly critical response from Olesen Larsen, which leads to yet more critical
responses where Olesen Larsen labels Løgstrup as a humanist, but again this is
because of Løgstrup’s objections to Kierkegaard in other texts – not because of
his position in “Humanism and Christianity.” These two texts from 1950, along
with other texts from the early 1950s, come together in The Ethical Demand.
It was published on November 27th, but a few months earlier, on September
8th, Hal Koch sent the following letter to Løgstrup after having read the full
manuscript:
Dear Koste!
It is now 1 am and since 5 o’clock I have (with brief interruptions) enjoyed intense pleasure
from reading your book! I wanted to tell you this. I am impressed by the confidence and
authority with which you write, and you have – in manifold ways – provided lucidity and
coherence where I saw only confused bits and pieces when speaking of Christianity, ethics,
politics, etc. I agree completely with your elucidations, and I envy your clarity. I jolly well
didn’t know that you are this clever. I would that I dare write a review, but it lies beyond my
abilities. I doubt that Søe20 – the oaf – understands it, but I will assist him.
It was good to see you! Greet Rosemari for me!
And thank you for the book!
Your
H. K.21
19 Cf. Knud E. Løgstrup, Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur
Verkündigung. Berlin: Eric Blaschker Verlag, 1950; Kierkegaards og Heideggers Eksistensanalyse
og dens Forhold til Forkyndelsen, ed. Svend Andersen. Aarhus: Klim, 2013; Kierkegaard’s and
Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation, translated by Robert Stern et
al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
20 Niels Hansen Søe (1895–1978) was Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of
Copenhagen from 1939–1966. He was one of the first Danish theologians to be influenced by
Barth and dialectical theology. A central point of controversy between Løgstrup and Søe through
the years was their positions on ethics, where Søe objected to Løgstrup’s resistance towards a
specifically Christian ethics. On this, Søe held that Jesus’s demand was indeed not silent, and so
Jesus’s ethical teaching should be understood as a Christian ethics.
21 Løgstrup, Koch, Venskab og strid, 220, our translation.
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